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Abstract 
Over the last decade, Swedish labour relations have ttracted 
relatively little scholarly attention, not least due to their ‘normalization’ 
along the lines of continental European practices. This article argues that 
the Swedish Model of labour concertation and social p rtnership has 
survived the turbulence of the 1990s, and the main reason for that is the 
salient power resources that uniosn and social democrats have retianed. 
The Model’s recent resurgence is intimately linked to the ability of the 
trade unions to co-regulate the labour market, which is a result of the 
organisational and institutional resources they posses . These are, 
however, under attack since the election of the Reinfeldt government in 
2006. A complete explanation of their contemporary role in Swedish 
industrial relations necessitates a nuanced theoretical approach that rejects 
purely materialist and interest-oriented perspectivs. Instead, the article 
suggests a historical institutionalist framework combining interests with 
ideas embedded in institutional configurations. 
Keywords: Employers, institutionalism, interests, Swedish Model, trade unions. 
1. Introduction 
Starting in the 1930s and for over five decades, the ‘Swedish 
Model’ became synonymous with a strong welfare state nd 
harmonious labor relations. The role played by trade unions and 
employers in this process was crucial: in a spirit of compromise 




Agreement of 1938 (Casparsson, 1966), the trade union confederation 
(LO) and the private employers’ confederation (SAF) established a 
modus vivendi characterized by social partner autonomy, important 
powers over their affiliated members and a mutual willingness to 
regulate the labor market. Works councils were establi hed in 1946, 
and remained in force until 1977, in order for employees to receive 
information and advice on the pace, quality and change at the 
workplace. Importantly, these councils were established by mutual 
agreement, signifying the high degree of cooperation and trust that 
was established during the Saltsjöbaden era (Kjellberg, 1992). The 
centralization of collective bargaining in the 1950s made the role of 
LO and SAF even more important, and by the 1970s LO had secured 
labor legislation that made employee information and consultation a 
precondition for managerial decision-making.1  
Nevertheless, Swedish industrial relations underwent rapid 
transformation in the early 1990s. In fact, the viabil ty of the Swedish 
Model regarding social partnership and the prospect for stable wage 
development became uncertain after the decision by SAF to withdraw 
from centralized collective bargaining and all corporatist bodies of 
representation (Rothstein, 1996; De Geer, 1992). Accounting for the 
employers’ refusal to continue collaboration, which was also 
accompanied by their espousal of free-market economics and repeated 
calls for the privatization of the Swedish welfare state ‘by the end of 
the century’ (Pestoff, 1995: 165; Visser, 1996: 188), the interest-based 
or materialist explanation put forward most eloquently by Peter 
Swenson and Jonas Pontusson (Swenson, 1989; Pontusson, 1995) 
focuses on two core premises. Firstly, the ‘cross-cla s alliance’ 
between employers and unions in the export sector, and the industrial 
sector in particular, saw its payoffs diminish following the indexed 
wage increases that public sector unions and employers had imposed 
on the negotiating table since the 1960s. Secondly, post-Fordist modes 
of production altered the payoff matrix for different unions, and the 
increase in public sector employment to offset low rates of 
employment creation enhanced the bargaining power of public sector 
employees vis-à-vis their private sector counterparts.  
This paper seeks to advance an alternative theoretical and 
methodological approach to the ‘interest-based’ explanation by 
                                                
1  This was part of the provisions entailed in the Co-Determination Act 
(Medbestämmandelagen). It has been argued that such pie es of legislation led to the 
demise of the old Swedish Model as they legitimized state intervention in the labor 
market in contrast to the social partner autonomy principle (Korpi, 1983). 
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analyzing the development of the Swedish Model, and incorporating 
the post-1990s era into the analysis. It argues that an attempt should 
be made to integrate interest-based explanations in an approach that 
combines the insights of historical institutionalism with the 
importance of ideas, defined as ‘road maps that help guide political 
actors through confused and uncertain periods’ (Berman, 2001: 235). 
Such periods were both the 1930s, at which time the foundations for 
the longevity of the Swedish labor movement as a decisive player in 
the development of the country’s political economy were set, but also 
the 1990s, out of which the Swedish Model has emerged transformed, 
but largely intact. An approach that goes beyond materialist 
explanations is necessary so as to account for continuity in social 
partnership in Sweden. Such an approach confirms the salience of 
ideas in shaping policy outcomes, enabling institutional actors to 
shape policy paths during periods of uncertainty. 
The first part of the paper will illuminate Swenson’s theory and 
assert its usefulness regarding the central role of mployers in the 
Swedish Model. I will then argue a theoretical case emphasizing the 
importance of historical institutionalism and the role of ideas, along 
with materialist explanations, in the evolution of Swedish labor 
relations. The paper’s hypothesis is that despite changes both in the 
international economic and political environment as well as the 
domestic configuration of power, significant elements of the Swedish 
Model’s core assumptions have withstood the test of time and 
continue to inform policy-making. The third part will draw attention 
to the inadequate attention paid to the labor movement and its 
institutional innovations by interest-based explanations, before 
proceeding with the use of empirical evidence to support the paper’s 
main argument. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the main 
points. 
2. The impact of economic and technological change 
Peter Swenson and Jonas Pontusson have been the most 
prominent representatives of an interest-based understanding of 
Swedish labor relations. By expanding on a well-articulated 
methodology, they have contributed to a better understanding of the 
specific circumstances that led to the big changes of the 1980s and 
1990s. They have also added the previously neglected dimension of 
the role of capital in triggering reform.  
The notion of cross-class alliances between employers and 




centralized bargaining in the 1980s (Swenson, 1991). Such alliances 
between some unions and employers are the result of distributional 
conflicts within the labor movement. Unions and employers that 
benefit from a given distributional matrix resulting from a 
decentralized mode of bargaining are likely to push for such an 
outcome (Swenson, 1992). In the Swedish case, considering that the 
export sector had long played a pace-setting role in wage negotiations, 
it is asserted that metalworkers and their employers d cided to break 
the mould when the returns from centralized negotiati ns were 
diminishing, and the relative gains of the public sector unions were 
increasing at their expense (Swenson and Pontusson, 2000). By 
underlying the importance of such alliances, interest-based 
explanations have corrected to a large extent the drawbacks of labor-
centred theories, which paid scant attention to the internal politics of 
the labor movement.2  
Another important addition to the literature on labor relations is 
the emphasis on the changing nature of work in the 1970s and the 
rapid increase in public sector employment (Pontusson and Swenson, 
1996). It is argued that, during the 1950s and 1960s, wage drift was 
mainly directed to blue-collar workers since their white-collar 
counterparts remained outside this unofficial arrangement (Swenson, 
1989). Things changed, however, and unequal wage drift between 
different occupational categories became increasingly difficult to 
sustain when white-collar unions grew and demanded a seat in the 
negotiating table. The introduction in 1970 of ‘earnings development 
guarantees’ to white-collar unions in the industrial sector was 
designed to ‘reinstate differentials present at the beginning of previous 
wage rounds, thereby pre-emptively capturing a portion of what LO 
might obtain for its members in total non-inflationary wage increases’ 
(Swenson, 1989: 149).  The effect of such policies played a crucial 
role in undermining the centrally coordinated wage bargaining model. 
The role of employers is here seen in an analytical l ght. Far 
from being passive recipients of governmental initiatives, dominated 
by the Social Democratic party (SAP) and reacting to legislative 
measures, they take center stage in instituting change (Pestoff, 1995). 
                                                
2  Labor- or power resource theories retained strong explanatory power during the years 
of Keynesian welfare and stability in the labor market. By the beginning of the 1980s, 
however, their credibility had been tainted, not least due to their failure to foresee the 
fate of crucial policy initiatives, such as the “wage earner funds” suggested by LO 
economist Rudolf Meidner in the 1970s. For representative work of this school see 
Korpi (1978, 1983), Stephens (1979), Castles (1978). 
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In fact, Swenson’s 2002 book contribution to the debat  argues that 
the cross-class alliance between labor and capital ac ually goes back to 
the beginning of the twentieth century (Swenson, 2002). Labor-
centered or institutional approaches (Rothstein, 1998) that emphasize 
the role of LO and SAP miss the point. It is the employers who 
contributed most to the smooth build-up of the Swedish welfare state 
and labor market by either actively endorsing social democratic 
proposals, or opting for silent support. While LO got the credit for 
labor-friendly reforms after the 1930s, the employers decided not to 
make their satisfaction with these reforms public. Doing so risked 
adding to union militancy and dissatisfaction with the reformist LO 
leadership by extreme elements in the unions. It was only on two 
occasions throughout the Model’s Golden Age, Swenson admits, that 
a clash between labor and capital can be observed: the 1934 
unemployment insurance reform and the controversial pension reform 
scheme in the late 1950s.3 Even in those occasions, however, the ‘raw’ 
labor-capital clash thesis advocated by institutionalist and power 
resources scholars can hardly be sustained. After elaborating on SAF 
archival documentation regarding the 1934 reform for example, 
Swenson concludes: ‘the SAF leadership as a whole pr bably looked 
with some favor, or at least benign ambivalence, at the prospect of the 
unemployment insurance system adding to the unions’ membership’ 
(Swenson, 2002: 256). 
Going back to the decentralization issue, the employers in 
engineering industries are said to have been key in that process due to 
their strategic reprioritization of production techniques enhancing 
wage flexibility in the 1980s (Pontusson, 1992). What is more, 
Swenson refutes the power mobilization thesis as regards the 
dominant position of labor after the 1938 Saltsjöbaden Agreement and 
the centralization of collective bargaining. In fact, it was SAF that 
insisted on the need for centralizing agreements as the best means of 
avoiding inflationary pressures, costly strikes and the disruption of 
productivity (Swenson, 2002). Centralization was necessary, as the 
Swedish export industry enjoyed a high comparative advantage to its 
continental competitors after World War II. SAF therefore made sure 
that even the most recalcitrant unions would accept n ralization as a 
means to an end. An additional motivating factor for the employers 
(indeed for most Nordic business associations) was the structural 
                                                
3  As the pension reform relates more to explicitly welfare arrangements than labor 





dependence of industries exposed and/or vulnerable to international 
trade. Their room of maneuver through raising prices was limited due 
to their inability to pass increased costs to consumers. Larger 
countries could afford to resist pressures for international discipline 
through their wider margins in the domestic markets, but SAF was 
obliged to regulate pay across the board so as to increase predictability 
in wage increases and therefore keep export companies competitive. 
This strategy fitted well the SAP agenda of productive politics, and 
became synonymous with what has been termed social democratic 
corporatism (Iversen and Pontusson, 2000).  
3. Historical Institutionalism and the Swedish Model 
One of the central preoccupations for historical institutionalists 
is to show how institutions structure the choices open to political 
decision-making (Blyth, 2002). In this respect, institutions limit the 
choices open to policy-makers by restricting the number of feasible 
policy ideas (Cambell, 1998). To that extent, they r strain change. 
Indeed, one of the main shortcomings of historical nstitutionalism is 
its difficulty in accounting for change. A further distinctive feature of 
historical institutionalism is its rejection of deterministic and 
structuralist accounts inherent in other new institutionalist approaches, 
such as rational choice and sociological accounts. While they share a 
lot of common ground with rational choice in that they deem actors to 
be strategic and calculative, historical institutionalists acknowledge 
that institutions are structures whose utility in serving certain goals 
has to be empirically verified. The outcome of such a process is an 
open question and hence cannot be a priori determined (Hay and 
Wincott, 1998). Interactions between agents take place in a framework 
of institutional struggle and the results of such struggles are not 
necessarily derived from the institutional framework within which 
they occur. Historical institutionalism stresses path dependency, 
inasmuch as it subscribes to the view that the same institutional 
configuration can produce very different results in different settings in 
accordance with contextual features arising from the istorical 
evolution of a given polity and the time sequence of vents. That is the 
result of the implicit encouragement offered to societal forces to 
organize and behave in a way to align themselves to past policy 
legacies (Hall and Taylor, 1996).  
In a historical institutionalist setting, change is the result of the 
interaction between actors and the context in which they operate. 
Action and context find themselves in a position of simultaneous 
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strategic interdependence. There is a wide array of factors leading to 
change that encompasses the calculations associated with a policy 
move towards change, the actual attempt to form a new framework of 
change, the institutional context in which action is enabled but also, 
crucially, ‘the shaping of the perceptions of the context in which 
strategy is conceived in the first place’ (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 955). 
Such a formulation enables the resolution of the problem of explaining 
change, inasmuch as it includes an often neglected variable in the 
more static alternatives of institutionalist thinkig: the role of ideas. 
Though these should not be treated as autonomous from their 
institutional surroundings, they interact with the institutional context 
and give rise to certain interpretations of reality that go a long way in 
shaping the institutional environment where policy actors come to 
define their priorities. In other words, it is ideas placed within 
institutions that inform preference formation of actors, thereby leading 
to their changed perception of the desirable outcome. Change results 
from strategic action by actors/agents; agents shape the changed polity 
over a period of time based on an altered set of perce tions and beliefs 
that is itself the product of ideational mobility. On their own, ideas 
cannot explain where new attitudes towards institutional 
configurations are derived from. If, however, placed in an institutional 
context that assigns primary importance to their interaction with the 
institutional setting, they facilitate understanding of the motives and 
tactical maneuvering leading to an altered framework of operation for 
actors (Blyth, 2002: 307). On the basis of policy legacies, evolution 
and change can be traced to a historical institutional st account 
through the interplay of path dependent political options and path 
shaping strategies (Torfing, 2001) chosen by policy a tors.  
Historical institutionalism, by combining an institutionally 
derived framework of preference formation with the importance of 
ideational change in informing policy making, can best account for 
both the crisis in Swedish labor relations but also, by examining 
patterns of institutional formation, developments af er the 1990s crisis. 
Chief among the benefits of a historical institutionalist approach is its 
ability to depict the privileged position enjoyed by socio-political 
forces dominant in the old institutional configuration at times of 
change. The privileges of these groups, here identifi d with the labor 
movement, result from the successful following of an earlier policy 
path to which they have substantially contributed, not least through 
deliberate design but also through the input provided by ‘long-lasting 




2001), mainly associated with the historical evoluti n of the Swedish 
state apparatus (Andersson, 1956; Andersson and Weibull, 1973). By 
the early 20th century, Sweden was transformed from an essentially 
agricultural country to a rapidly expanding industrial society with 
more than half of the population residing in cities (Andersson and 
Weibull, 1973). Significantly, Sweden’s late industrialization gave 
rise to large and concentrated industrial firms. Under such 
circumstances, the cooperation between business leaders nd, later on, 
between business and the state became easier (Berman, 1998: 43). 
The policy path that was crystallized in the 1930s allowed the 
institutional and organizational emancipation of the Swedish labor 
movement, whose utilization of its beneficial positi n permitted the 
long-term ‘freezing’ of favorable power relations. However, as 
Torfing points out, a policy path is inherently elastic, subject to 
constant renegotiation, and contains the sperms of institutional reform 
(Torfing, 2001). It is this elasticity, resulting from the ability of 
material as well as ideational factors to come intoplay, which explains 
the change of the 1980s and 1990s. Nonetheless, the maintaining of 
significant institutional resources by the previously dominating policy 
actors does not rest solely on contingent factors. Rather, it emerges 
from the unequal distribution of resources between competing blocs, 
whose fight for the consolidation of their preferred institutional 
pattern depends on the interaction between historically informed 
policy options as well as the relative power of competing strategies.  
Applying a historical institutionalist type of analysis to the study 
of the Swedish Model entails a significant methodolgical advantage. 
It enables the incorporation of materialist coalition-building practices 
in a holistic framework that explains the creation, stability but also 
change of policy paradigms (Hall, 1993: 280) on thebasis of a 
longitudinal, dynamic interaction between institutions and ideas. An 
analysis of the breakdown of centralized bargaining eeds to 
incorporate elements that go beyond mere coalition building and relate 
to the multiplicity of institutional actors in delivering industrial peace.  
4. A critique of interest-based approaches 
4.1. False Homogeneity 
Approaches such as the ones put forward by Swenson and 
Pontusson have incorporated the salience of technological evolution in 
their analysis. Swenson’s meticulous research has further strengthened 
his thesis on the salience of a cross-class consensu . Still, their 
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 295
approach entails important weaknesses. Firstly, work done by 
Pontusson often assumes a monolithic construction of the Swedish 
Model with finite starting points and end. The Model is placed in pre-
determined boxes of unshakable characteristics whose erosion 
manifests its demise (Pontusson, 1997). It is of course true that any 
definition of the Model needs to include certain core aspects. This 
should not mean, however, that such categories have a) b en rationally 
planned and executed over time and b) are solely th result of labor or 
capital-directed outcomes. To illustrate, Swenson claims that ‘the 
labor movement’ assisted employers in the 1940s and 1950s through 
active labor market policy and compulsory national insurance 
(Swenson, 2002). This implies that LO and the government can be 
interpreted as one and the same entity deciding unanimously. Such an 
approach overlooks differences that have been frequently manifested 
between them, not least during the ‘War of the Roses’ p riod in the 
1980s (Feldt, 1991). In the case of active labor maket policy, the 
government only accepted the proposals with considerabl  delay and 
after senior ministers had dismissed the proposals in public. Swenson 
himself supports this view and provides the evidence for it (Swenson, 
2002: 275-77).  
4.2. Dismissing Ideology 
Another shortcoming of this approach is its inflated emphasis on 
the power of capital in shaping parts of the Swedish Model in different 
ways and at different times. For instance, the employers’ offensive is 
analyzed in great detail with regard to potentially underlying material 
interests. However, there is little mentioning of the ideological 
character of their decision, and the extent to which the 1980s 
mobilization assumed regime-changing characteristics. It would be 
more appropriate to view the decentralization of colle tive bargaining 
in the context of ideological transformation, heavily influenced by the 
neo-liberal shift in public policy (Ryner, 2002). Furthermore, 
dismissing the political motives of SAF in taking this decision is 
problematic, even if one accepts the limitations poised by labor 
dominance theorists. The fact that LO has historically been a complex 
entity with diverse agendas should not lead to a rejection of its 
importance and growth in power. The employers had every reason to 
favor a diminishing of its power (Iversen and Pontusson, 2000), 
especially after LO had decided to address its demands directly to the 




materialist analysis is characterized by a disproportionate sense of 
economic determinism that assigns overarching powers to the power 
of economic change in directing political outcomes (Hall, 1993). This 
becomes evident when analyzing the transformation of SAF in more 
detail. 
In 1980, and after it had triggered a lockout reminiscent of pre-
Saltsjöbaden practices, SAF signed separate agreements with LO and 
PTK (Privattjänstemannakartellen, white-collar union cartel) in order 
to limit the effectiveness of coordinated bargaining. The failure of the 
1980 lockout played an important part in the decision by VF 
(Verkstadsföreningen, employers in engineering industries 
‘association) and SAF to proceed with decentralization of bargaining. 
The agreements signed after 1983, in contrast to established practice, 
did not include a peace clause binding unions and employers to 
industrial peace (Kjellberg, 1992). In the same year, the SAF 
newsletter appointed a new editor-in-chief who commissioned articles 
critical of the Historic Compromise, adopting a more populist line and 
provoking fierce debates (Olsen, 1994). Challenging the Swedish 
Model and its policy outcomes with regard to social we fare, the role 
of the state in economic policy, the operation of the labor market, the 
‘correct’ level of taxation and corporatist politics meant that SAF had 
to energize functions and institutions that had previously been 
peripheral to its operation. Back in the 1940s, SAF operated the 
Directors’ Club, a body dedicated to preventing therealization of 
Social Democratic post-war plans regarding nationalzation. It also 
founded the Joint Committee for Private Commerce and Industry 
(NÄSO) and the Swedish Free Enterprise Foundation (NÄFO) to keep 
the labor movement in check (Blyth, 2002). The strategy proved 
successful, and SAF cooperated with the SAP so longas the party 
denounced the more radical elements of its 1944 Postwar Program 
(SAP, 1944). The decision by the Social Democrats to drop their 
nationalization plans meant that such bodies were rduced to an 
apolitical role.  
In 1978, SAF augmented its advertising campaign and l unched 
a series of conferences, public meetings and fairs where it promoted 
the virtues of free market capitalism. A series of study groups were 
created, and 250 SAF officers and 400 business leaders took part in 
them between December 1980 and January 1981 (Hyrdman, 1988). 
Between January and May 1982, SAF produced 200 recommendations 
for policy action related to tax and welfare cuts, privatization schemes 
and labor market legislation. Along with NÄSO and NÄFO, SAF also 
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made use of think tanks, such as the Center for Busines  and Policy 
Studies (SNS) (Blyth, 2002) and publishing houses like Timbro and 
Ratio. Electronic media were also utilized: local radio stations 
broadcasted SAF messages and its information campaign t rgeted 
specific groups, such as journalists and students (Whyman and 
Burkitt, 1993).  
A study by Kristina Boréus found that ‘new liberal’ ideas in op-
ed pieces of the conservative Svenska Dagbladet increased from 30 
percent in 1975 to 70 percent in 1989 while the corresponding figures 
for the liberal Dagens Nyheter between 1971 and 1989 were 15 and 30 
percent (Boréus, 1997: 263-66). The results were impressive. In 1978 
only 30 percent of people thought it important to encourage 
entrepreneurship, and 37 percent thought of busines l aders as 
efficient in the running of enterprises. By the mid-1980s the figure to 
the first issue had become 75 percent and as for the second, the 
percentage of those agreeing that business is efficient had by 1997 
become too high to merit further research (Henrekson and Jakobsson, 
2003). The ability of SAF to launch a successful propaganda 
campaign at different levels was heavily dependent on its financial 
muscle. It has been estimated that only in 1982 SAFspent around 55-
60 million crowns in its campaign against the wage-earner funds that 
LO had proposed. By comparison, all five major political parties spent 
69 million crowns in the 1982 pre-election campaign. The doubling of 
SAF dues and resources in the 1970s meant SAF enjoyed two times 
the income of LO and had increased its strategic reserv s eight-fold in 
1980 (Blyth, 2001). The alliance created after the arrival of Curt 
Nicolin at the top of SAF in 1976 was strong enough in its quest to 
dismantle the old Swedish Model and inspire the Swedish right with 
new ideas (Olsen, 1994: 212). VF soon managed to uni e SAF around 
the theme of decentralization.  
It is naturally fair to say that the sector that was pushing for 
[change] was basically the manufacturing industry …but as the debate 
went on … I know that the opinions of what you call the sheltered 
sector changed and when the decision  [to withdraw f om corporatist 
boards] was taken it was unanimous. 4 
 
                                                
4  Interview with Sverker Rudeberg, Senior Adviser on Labor Market Policy, Svenskt 




4.3. Institutional design matters: reformism and the Ghent 
unemployment insurance scheme 
Interest-centered scholars have paid inadequate attention to the 
role of both institutions and ideas in shaping prefer nce formation. 
This is hardly surprising in light of their conviction that material 
interests are at the core of the process and institutional and ideational 
influences have to be analyzed by prioritizing changes in the material 
world (Swenson, 1989).5 Nonetheless, this approach tends to 
depoliticize decision-making and portray changes in the normative 
convictions of policy actors as exogenous to their programmatic 
ambitions. This is a highly questionable assumption, bearing in mind 
the growth of SAP as the party of government and the opportunities 
that this offered to LO unions to advance their agenda. 
The evolution of the Swedish state and the character it had 
assumed over centuries made the Social Democrats aware of the 
benefit to be had in treating the state as a potential ally. In 1902, SAP 
leader Hjalmar Branting emphasized that the state ws not necessarily 
an instrument of class domination. It could play a critical role in 
alleviating the misery of the poor and assist them in improving their 
material condition (Ahn, 1996). Already by the turn of the 20th 
century, Swedish social democracy had developed a distinct concept 
of socialism, which it sought to popularize through educational, 
material and political manifestos. In contrast to their sister parties 
elsewhere in Europe, the Swedish social democrats discovered the 
road to reformism early  (Berman, 1998).  
Until the 1930s, the reformist wing adhered to the economic line 
of the Labor Party on the need to maintain balanced bu gets and 
reduce wages and prices to boost the business cycle(Martin, 1979). 
After the electoral setback for SAP in 1928, a close circle of 
intellectuals led by Ernst Wigforss sought to mobilize society by use 
of ideas. To do so, they attempted to rationalize Swedish life by 
arguing on the basis of the need for ‘scientific’ principles to dominate 
over sheer emotionalism in decision-making (Eyerman, 1985). 
Wigforss challenged the prevailing consensus on economic policy, 
arguing that there was no causal connection between low wages and 
high unemployment. In fact, higher wages would increase the 
purchasing power of consumers and thus enable more outl ts for the 
                                                
5  Swenson does not dismiss institutionalism as an explanatory tool, but rightly 
reprimands its followers for assuming a uniformity of interests across countries and 
within classes and interest groups. 
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products of manufacturers resulting in higher employment and growth 
(Lewin, 1967). The ideational justification of full employment went a 
long way towards appeasing the middle class of Social Democratic 
intentions and solidified working class support. Thus, the Social 
Democrats became the prime beneficiary of the widespread 
acceptance of full employment as an ideological goal and relations 
with the unions acquired a new dynamism.  
In the post-WWII period, the work of chief LO economists 
Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner consolidated the labor m vement’s 
hold in the field of workable political ideas. Centrally coordinated 
wage bargaining, suggested by the SAF and accepted by LO in 1952, 
would allow the unions to strive for both wage increases and wage 
equality (Locke & Thelen, 1995: 344) as the inter-union rivalry that 
led to the creation of a wage and price spiral would disappear 
(Vartiainen, 1998: 24). Achieving the goal of wage equality for 
different sectors meant setting the wage rate at a ‘just’ level, rather 
than according to the individual firm’s ability to pay (Erixon, 2001: 
18). Efficient and productive firms would be provided with extra labor 
supply and gain incentives to expand in the dynamic se tors of the 
economy. Higher rates of growth would follow, strengthening the 
competitiveness of the Swedish economy and enabling the 
consolidation and expansion of the welfare state. In fficient firms 
would be hard-pressed by the profit squeeze resulting from the 
solidaristic wage policy (Lindbeck, 1997: 1291). To facilitate the 
movement of workers from the wasteful to the productive sectors of 
the economy and abolish regional ‘islands of unemployment’, the 
model advocated an active labor market policy. The state would 
assume responsibility by providing employees with educational skills, 
retraining schemes and incentives to encourage occupational mobility 
(Erixon, 2001: 19). AMS would therefore remain at the heart of the 
transition process from unemployment to paid work. Regarding fiscal 
and monetary policy, the model advocated a tight control over the 
economic cycle, so as to keep inflation in check and guarantee price 
stability. Total demand should be restricted in order to avoid an 
overheating of the economy and an increase in wage and labor costs. 
Gösta Rehn even went as far as publishing an article in 1957 entitled 
‘Hate Inflation’ to emphasize that full employment should not be 
bought at the expense of high inflation (Eklund, 2001: 66). After 
introducing Keynesianism in the 1930s, the labor movement 
pioneered a further economic pattern that increased it  attractiveness 




Rehn-Meidner Model by the government after the mid-1950s 
reinforced the role of the unions in Swedish society. 
As stated above, Swenson finds two exceptions to his cross-
class alliance paradigm: the 1934 unemployment insurance scheme 
and the 1959 pension reform. However, both were decisiv  in shaping 
the contours of the Swedish Model and their dismissal as mere 
‘exceptions’ tends to negate their significance. It is for precisely that 
reason that the reform of unemployment insurance system as 
implemented by the center-right government since 2006 has proven 
deeply controversial.6 
The first greatly facilitated the strengthening of unions by 
increasing their membership levels. SAP encouraged the further 
growth of LO and its affiliated unions in the 1930s by making the 
latter responsible for the administration of unemployment insurance, 
despite initial union protest (Fulcher, 2002). ‘Taking effect from 1935, 
the law provided for government subsidization of private insurance 
arrangements set up by individual unions – the so called Ghent, or 
voluntary system’ (Swenson, 2002: 254). In this way, union 
membership was encouraged with non-union members saving on the 
membership fee but benefiting through union-negotiated wage 
increases. The creation of an optional unemployment insurance fund 
subsidized by the state meant that a set of very concrete incentives 
was built in the system, boosting union participation and increasing 
collective labor power. Although the creation of the unemployment 
funds was hardly an electoral asset for SAP at the im , the instigator 
of the plan, Social Affairs Minister Gustav Möller, was vindicated in 
his belief that such funds would secure the long-term increase of the 
power of organized labor (Rothstein, 1992). Swenson accepts that one 
of SAF’s objections related to the potential strengthening of the labor 
movement. The view of former SAF leader von Sydow was that the 
new system would ‘help drive the workers into unions’. Although 
SAF did support membership of workers to social democratic unions 
after a certain time (Swenson, 2002: 254-56), the 1934 reform was 
instrumental in strengthening the institutional and organizational 
power of labor, premised on institution building to secure long-term 
benefits. On a critical juncture, the Social Democrats opted for long-
term institution building and structured the possible alternatives in line 
with their own objectives (Ebbinghaus, 2005). Ideas and material 
                                                
6  Lack of space forbids the analytical discussion of th se reforms. Their main goal is the 
reduction in unemployment replacement rate and the long-term weakening of unions 
through the transformation of the system into a compulsory one.  
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interests interacted in a very concrete form to establish the privileged 
position of the Swedish labor movement. 
5. Labor market regulation and the Industrial Agreem nt: 
path dependence and institutional heritage  
 Over the 1980s and until the beginning of the 1990s, 
negotiations between SAF and LO and PTK drifted from the peak to 
the industry level. The 1990s was a decisive period following the 
decentralization of bargaining, the politicization of SAF and the 
decline of labor union power. The decline of LO power witnessed in 
the 1980s and internal splits in the Confederation, mainly between 
export-dependent unions and their public sector equivalents, gave the 
impression that LO decline was almost inevitable. Following the self-
imposed termination of peak-level negotiations, SAF called for 
‘coordinated decentralization’ characterized by plant-level wage 
bargaining and industry-level agreements on general conditions of 
employment. It was a powerful assault on the superior position of LO 
at the ideational level, focused more on attempting to shift the 
discursive base of the Model rather than introducing immediate policy 
results. This is best manifested by the plant-level ‘partnership 
contracts’ (medarbetaravtal) that engineering firms introduced 
encompassing both blue-and white-collar employees (Swenson and 
Pontusson, 2000), which have been rather limited in number. 
Meanwhile, ‘figureless’ agreements were also signed, meaning that no 
wage increases were agreed at the national level. This was often 
down, though not exclusively, to decentralization and the inability to 
coordinate wage demands among the various LO unions. 
The pattern of labor market regulation that stood at the center of 
social partnership has re-emerged after the turbulent first half of the 
1990s. Export-oriented employers have stopped short of their threats 
to disengage from the unions and Svenskt Näringsliv (SN), the 
Swedish Enterprise organization created after the merging of SAF 
with the Federation of Swedish Industries, has also signaled its 
intention to retain the collective agreements system and regulate the 
labor market in partnership with the unions. LO has retained a 
coordination role regarding minimum wage increase demands, and 
‘figureless’ agreements were on the way down by 2005 
(Medlingsinstitutet, 2005). According to some observers, Swedish 
labor relations have met with a revival second only to the 
Saltsjöbaden accord (Elvander, 2002); in fact, signing a ‘second 




LO. Essentially, the shift to a lower level of bargining has not been 
accompanied by the realization of all changes envisaged by 
employers, which entailed the possibility for firms to move white-
collar workers between different tasks while indiviualizing the wages 
of manual workers, ending up with ‘the best of both worlds, blue-
collar job flexibility and white-collar pay flexibility’ (Martin cited in 
Kjellberg, 1998: 88). Faced with the prospect of such a deal, blue- and 
white-collar unions in the engineering sector cemented their alliance 
to avoid exclusive wage bargaining to the local leve  by forming a 
bargaining cartel (Ryner, 1997: 45). Their collaboration and 
increasing significance for the Swedish economy led to the Industrial 
Agreement in 1997. Increased cross-occupational collab ration 
became part of the unions’ strategy to prevent the development of 
enterprise unionism and retain the level of bargaining to the industrial 
level (Thelen, 1993: 47). 
In March 1997 and following a Metall initiative, the Industrial 
Agreement (IA) was signed by 12 employer organizations and 7 trade 
unions across the occupational spectrum. The Agreement set out to 
offer a new mode of regulating the labor market in the industrial 
sector by avoiding industrial action for as long as po sible, promoting 
industrial development and enhancing profitability to secure sound 
wage development (Elvander, 2002). To achieve these goals, the two 
sides agreed on the establishment of an Industrial Committee 
composed of employers and union representatives. The Committee 
became responsible for the supervision of bargaining, and has the 
power to intervene in the negotiations at an early stage. It can also 
force the halt of industrial action. All demands from the two sides 
have to be put forward at the start of the negotiati ns. In case an 
agreement runs out before it is renewed, an impartial chair of the 
Industrial Committee has the authority to intervene, put forward 
proposals and delay industrial action for up to 14 days (Ohlsson, 
2003). The agreement was tested in the bargaining round of 1998 for 
the first time and was successful. All timetables were kept, industrial 
action was not contemplated and the wage levels agreed became the 
norm for the rest of the labor market (Elvander, 2002). By 2005, the 
Mediation Authority was reporting that ‘the principle of “completion 
in time” is now established in the Swedish labor market’ 
(Medlingsinstitutet, 2005). The reinvigoration of a spirit of 
collaboration between employers and unions is mediat  by the 
realization that enhanced competition and the Europeanization of 
Sweden’s labor market poses new challenges with regard to 
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competitiveness and the maintenance of high standards regarding pay 
and the working environment. State interference in collective 
bargaining, a distinct possibility in the aftermath of the crisis, is now 
removed from the agenda (Murhem, 2003).  
The Industrial Agreement is highly significant for two more 
reasons. Firstly, contrary to the stance they had adopted until then, 
employers in engineering industries abandoned confrontation for 
collaboration and formed a new industrial relations regime for the 
manufacturing sector (Elvander, 2002). Employers welcomed the 
willingness of the unions to reach a comprehensive agreement going 
beyond bread and butter issues. A negotiator of the IA on the 
employers’ side has stated that the agreement has ‘reinvigorated the 
Saltsjöbaden spirit’ between employers and the unions.  
They realized that we would have to have a common [purpose] 
in a lot of things … [the agreement] was not only about salaries and 
wages it was also about taxes and energy and research issues … it has 
been successful because the first negotiation agreements should be set 
within the industry sector and I think that is [the opinion] of LO too … 
we have set a platform.7  
Secondly, employers in engineering industries were not willing 
to renew collaboration with the unions solely because of the 
Europeanization of Swedish industrial relations. Employers in the 
state sector too took the initiative for an agreement in 1997, which 
was reached a year later, made explicit reference to the IA and even 
included joint committees for conflict resolution following the 
Industrial Agreement’s example. Building on that momentum, the two 
sides proceeded with two agreements in 2000: ‘[t]he mutual trust 
established in the bargaining round of 1998 was codified in the 
cooperation agreement two years later’ (Elvander, 2002: 203). Thus, 
the acceptance of the export sector as a pointer for wage development 
became established practice and both sides in the labor market 
welcome the IA as a stabilizing force.8  
With regard to social partnership, the evidence avail ble points 
to a continuing willingness to reach mutually acceptable solutions. In 
a 1998 survey measuring the effects of the 1973 Act on rade union 
                                                
7  Interview with Jan Peter Duker, Deputy Director General, Svenskt Näringsliv, 
Stockholm,  22.9.2004. 
8  Interview with Gunnar Wetterberg, SACO Public Policy Director, 31.8.2004 ; Bernt 
Jansson, Ombudsman for the Social Democratic Party’s relations with LO, 24.9.2004 
and Anders Jonsson, Ombudsman for Municipalities Workers’ Union (Kommunal) 




representation on company boards, cooperation between employee 
representatives and other board members was deemed ‘good’ or ‘very 
good’ by 80 percent of companies. Nine out of ten companies 
recorded ‘good’ or ‘very good’ cooperation between managers and 
trade unions (Levinson, 2001: 260-66). In a similar survey carried out 
by the same institute in 2003, surveyed firms asserted that 
consultations with trade unions are seldom financially burdensome 
and although the influence of employees had diminished since 1996, 
the benchmark year, 48 percent of them saw employees as playing a 
decisive role in regulating issues affecting working time and the 
working environment (EIRO, 2004a). The climate of cooperation 
between the two sides was in this survey described as ‘good’ or ‘rather 
good’ by 81 percent of enterprises (EIRO, 2004b).  
The reinvigorated spirit of collaboration that both employers and 
union representatives admit to following the Industrial Agreement has 
led to more agreements – despite the failure of the ‘Alliance for 
Growth’ discussions in 1998.9 To a large extent, such agreements are 
not merely the result of willingness to cooperate. They result from the 
powerful role of the unions in the labor market, itself the result of very 
high levels of union density. Though evidence suggests a loosening of 
the link between union membership and the unemployment insurance 
fund, union density rates remain among the highest in the world at 
approximately 78% of the workforce and many unemployment 
insurance funds privilege union members on payment me hod and 
lengths of payment period compared to non-unionized m mbers (TCO 
Tidningen, 18 June 2006; Dagens Nyheter, 13 July 2006). Under such 
circumstances, the ideological hostility of employers to close 
cooperation is sacrificed for the sake of maintaining industrial peace 
and avoiding governmental interference through legis ation.  
A good illustration of this is the agreement reached b tween LO, 
PTK and SN in 2001 on a scheme for occupational injury scheme, 
according to which the injured employee would receive full 
compensation for loss of income and not be obliged to prove the fault 
of the employer any longer (EIRO, 2001). LO and SN also came 
together in two supplementary agreements, on a sick pay 
(Avtalsgruppsjukförsäkring, AGS) and insurance scheme against job 
                                                
9  On the initiative of LO economists, LO, TCO and SACO agreed to present a package 
of issues for negotiations with SAF, including EMU, wage bargaining labor legislation, 
taxes and ‘competence development’ (Stephens, 2000: 11). Pestoff (2002) elaborates on 
the negotiations and possible reasons for their failure.  
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loss (Avgångsbidragsförsäkring, AGB). SAF, LO and TCO have also 
created a co-owned company, AFA, which is responsible for 
collectively agreed insurance against death, work injuries, illness and 
redundancy (EIRO, 2003). In addition, LO and SN have created a 
Safety Foundation (Trygghetsfonden, TSL) in 2004, in whose board 
both sides are equally represented, to manage the support of 
employees who have recently been made redundant 
(http://www.tsl.se/AFATemplates/Page.aspx?id=116). This has come 
after another agreement between the two sides regardin  the need for 
an ‘insurance for change’ (omställningsförsäkring) was reached in 
2004 and foresaw negotiations between managers and local trade 
unions in case of forced redundancies to provide inividual help in the 
search for new employment (Dagens Industri, 1 September 2004).  
A final reflection of the centrality of trade unions post-1991 is 
the preliminary outcome of the ‘Vaxholm conflict’. In October 2004, 
the Latvian company ‘Laval un Partneri’ operating in the Stockholm 
suburb of Vaxholm refused to sign a collective agreem nt with the 
LO-affiliated Construction Workers Union Byggnads (Aftonbladet, 27 
November 2004). According to Swedish legislation and due to the fact 
that Laval was not a member of an employers organization, a 
collective agreement could only apply to Laval if it agreed to sign an 
individual (subsidiary) agreement with Byggnads (LO, 2005). In 
response, Byggnads called for a blockade and soon 6 LO unions 
joined the protest (Svenska Dagbladet, 21 January 2005). When Laval 
turned to the Labor Court, the latter decided in favour of the blockade 
(Dagens Nyheter, 22 December 2004). After a period of protracted 
conflict, Laval left the site. That decision was taken after a ruling by 
the European Court of Human Rights stated that the Sw dish Court 
was not partial (Dagens Nyheter, 22 January 2005). The subsequent 
decision by the Labor Court to seek the opinion of the European Court 
of Justice meant that the issue was likely to continue being hotly 
contested by both sides, and the court’s verdict is expected in early 
2008.  
Following the departure of the Latvian firm and an increase in 
the number of similar conflicts, SN and LO decided to set up 
guidelines for foreign firms that operate in Sweden on a temporary 
basis and, if necessary, assume responsibility for the upholding of 
these guidelines by their members (LO, 2005; Dagens Nyheter, 30 




to be tested in practice,10 and the two sides continue accusing each 
other of a hidden agenda.11 Nonetheless, the Vaxholm conflict points 
to a continued willingness to jointly regulate the broad contours of the 
labor market, as befits a coordinated market economy (Svenson and 
Öberg, 2003). 
6. Taking stock: the salience of institutional legacies  
The historical evolution of Swedish labor politics is of decisive 
importance regarding its subsequent evolution. The centralization of 
industrial relations in the early 20th century meant that firm-by-firm 
struggles were largely avoided and ‘extensive union access to 
workplaces helped maintain rank-and-file contact and organize 
workplace bargaining’ (Kjellberg, 1998: 617). The ability of both 
unions and employers to centralize and gain access to places of work, 
however, is not a coincidence. It is derived from the historical 
character of the Swedish state, and the concomitant emergence of 
industrialization and democratization that facilitated the growth of 
strong unions as part and parcel of a democratizing polity. What is 
more, this policy included a strong labor movement able to 
consolidate its numerical strength in the absence of a coherent 
conservative counter-force due to the democratic instincts of the 
peasantry and the reformist character of the Social Democratic party 
(Katzenstein, 1985). Unionization has also been assisted by social 
partner autonomy that enhanced the attractiveness of union 
membership (Kjellberg, 1992). The principle of self-r gulation in the 
labor market is again a by-product of an institutionally determined 
outcome of the balance of power that emerged in the 1930s 
(Johansson, 1992). Social partner autonomy resulted from an 
institutional bargain between the labor market partners and the state, 
based on the unanimous ambition to enhance economic growth. The 
most revealing example of the salience of historical institutionalism is 
the creation of a Ghent-type of unemployment insurance fund 
administered by the unions. Though the Ghent-type has come under 
attack from time to time, it is unlikely that the current center-right 
                                                
10  A series of agreements modelled on the LO-SN document have since been signed on a 
sectoral level. Dagens Arbete, 12 December 2005. 
11  Under the leadership of Urban Bäckström, former head of the Central bank, SN has 
toned up its rhetoric regarding labor market “imbalances”, calling for a limit on 
sympathy strike action. LO, for its part, has sought to mobilize its membership against 
such calls by pointing to the financial support that SN offered to Laval in the judicial 
proceedings of the Vaxholm case. 
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government will attempt to remove the unions from the administration 
of the system. 
At the time of the introduction of the unemployment insurance 
reform, the Social Democrats could hardly expect political gains, as 
the majority of workers were not unionized (Garrett, 1993). 
Nevertheless, the reform was part of an overall reform scheme that 
aimed at creating a political and economic climate conducive to the 
goals of the party. It was also premised on the divisions among the 
party’s political opponents at a time of structural economic changes 
(Garrett, 1993).   
7. Conclusion 
The above analysis does not negate the importance of an 
interest-based approach in outlining part of the Swedish Model’s 
story. It merely wishes to correct the latter’s overstated emphasis on 
material factors and stress that it is the interaction between interests, 
ideas and institutions that accounts for change (decentralization) as 
well as continuity post-1997. The case for such an approach has been 
strengthened by developments after the collapse of the old equilibrium 
in the 1990s, when the employers, rightly viewed by interest-based 
theorists as key in the build-up of the original arrangement, launched 
an ideological campaign against the existing pattern of labor market 
concertation. 
Historical institutionalism retains its explanatory vigor regarding 
the Swedish Model not only because of a certain successful resistance 
to change by LO under SAF pressure, but also becaus these actors 
are shown to be informed by a path-dependent attitude o the Model’s 
operation that has allowed them to become pro-active participants. 
Equipped with policy tools developed through the institutional 
maturation of the Swedish Model, such as the unemployment 
insurance scheme, the unions have succeeded in blocking the 
transformation of Swedish political economy along neo-liberal lines. 
The return of employers to the negotiating table on mi or and major 
issues, as well as the signing of the Industrial Agreement, reveal the 
lasting ability of unions to assume responsibility for the regulation of 
the labor market. It is on that level of responsibility, as well as their 
relevance in the workplace, that the role of trade unions in Sweden 
and elsewhere in Europe will be tested in the years to come. 
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Özet 
“Ne yaptıklarına değil, onu neden yaptıklarına bak”: Đsveç’te Đşverenler, 
Sendikalar ve Güç Kaynakları 
Son onyılda Đsveç emek ilişkileri, biraz da kıta Avrupası pratikleri doğrultusunda 
‘normalleşme’leri nedeniyle görece daha az akademik ilgi çekti. Bu makale Đsveç emek uyumu 
ve sosyal partnerlik modelinin 1990’ların çalkantısına rağmen ayakta kaldığ nı ve bunun asıl 
nedeninin sendikalar ve sosyal demokratların elinde bulundurduğu göze çarpan güç kaynakları 
olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Model’in yakın zamanda güçlenm si sendikaların, sahip oldukları 
örgütsel ve kurumsal kaynakların bir sonucu olan, emek piyasasını birlikte düzenleme 
yeteneklerine yakın bir şekilde bağlıdır. Ancak bu kaynaklar, 2006’da Reinfeldt hükümetinin 
seçilmesinden bu yana saldırı altındadır. Đsveç sınai ilişkilerindeki çağdaş rollerinin eksiksiz bir 
açıklaması katı materyalist ve çıkar yönelimli persktifleri reddeden ayrıntılı bir kuramsal 
yaklaşımı gereksinmektedir. Bu makale, bu perspektifler yrine, kurumsal konfigürasyonlarda 
yerleşik düşünceleri çıkarlarla birleştiren tarihsel kurumsalcı bir çerçeve önermektedir. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Đşverenler, kurumsalcılık, çıkarlar, Đsveç modeli, işçi sendikaları. 
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